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Abstract: We respond to a comment on our high-speed technique for the 
implementation of free-space quantum key distribution (QKD).  The model 
used in the comment assigns inappropriately high link losses to the 
technique in question; we show that the use of reasonable loss parameters in 
the model invalidates the comment’s main conclusion and highlights the 
benefits of increased transmission rates. 
 
A recent comment in this forum by Hughes and Nordholt [1] (hereafter HN) discusses a paper 
published by Bienfang et al. [2] (hereafter B) on quantum key distribution (QKD).  HN  
suggests that substantial conclusions of B are misleading, and that its implications for QKD 
are obscure.  These assertions disregard the relevance and scope of the work presented in B. 
The generation of sifted key is the primary function of the physical layer of any single-
photon QKD system, and B presents a scalable technique that significantly increases the 
capacity of the physical layer.  This technique is based on the adaptation of clock 
synchronization technology from modern telecommunications for use in QKD, and 
dramatically increases the transmission rate of the quantum channel.  As an experimental 
demonstration of this technique, B reports the continuous generation of sifted quantum 
cryptographic key over a 730 m free-space link at rates of 1 Megabit/second, with an error 
rate of 1.1%.  The sifted rate performance reported in B constitutes an increase in throughput 
over previously published reports by two orders of magnitude, and we stand by this 
conclusion.  As stated in HN, error correction and privacy amplification impose an additional 
overhead in the final throughput.  However, the relative gain to be had from increased 
transmission rate is unaffected. 
HN presents an extrapolation of the results of B to full QKD over a 10 km link, and 
asserts that the higher transmission rate would result in no improvement beyond that which 
has been demonstrated, for example, in ref. [3].  To arrive at this conclusion, HN imputes to B 
a link loss factor of –29 dB that is derived from treating the optical propagation of B in the 
asymptotic limit, where the intensity scales directly as the inverse-square of the distance.  
However, previous results [3] demonstrate that it is possible to design an optical system that 
experiences losses in the range of –13 dB to –19 dB over a 10 km link.  If we assume these 
same loss factors, we find that the analysis presented in HN would predict two orders of 
magnitude more secret key than reported in ref. [3].  This result is in agreement with 
straightforward scaling arguments, and disaffirms the statement in HN that the method of B 
would offer no advantage for QKD.  In fact, we expect that optimization for higher 
transmission rates will continue to produce significant increases in throughput. 
The argument of HN concerning the relationship between rate and reach of QKD 
deserves careful consideration, as it states that there is no advantage in reach to be gained by 
increasing the transmission rate.  In terms of telecommunications engineering considerations, 
any usable QKD system will be specified by the link length, L, and a requirement for the rate, 
R, of generation of secret key.  The main barrier in extending the length to L’ > L, while 
keeping R constant, is the greater link loss.  As HN notes, there is a set of link parameters 
beyond which no secret key can be generated.  Provided that this limit is not exceeded, any 
additional losses incurred by extending the link length that reduce R can be compensated for 
by increasing the transmission rate.  HN’s conclusion is based on taking L to be the length at 
which no usable secret key is obtained (R = 0).  At that point no change in transmission rate 
will affect the production of key, because there is no key produced.  This is correct as a 
logician’s exercise in reductio ad absurdum, but is not useful as a design criterion. 
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